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NOTE AND COMMENT
RSCHAT-How STATE ACQUntES Ti.-Escheat is of feudal origin, and
properly applied only to land which on failure of heirs or for certain other
reasons, "fell in" to the lord under whom it had been held. Personal prop-
erty without an owner, as bona vacantia, became the property of the crown.
In re Bond [Igo1] i Ch. 15. In the United States escheat is used more
broadly, but usually arises when the owner of property dies intestate without
heirs. Our'alienage laws have generally removed disabilities of aliens to
take, but in some jurisdictions there may still be escheat because of alienage,
see 5 MIcH. L. Rtv., 463. In others mortmain statutes provide for escheat
of certain property held by corporations, Louisville School Board v. King,
127 Ky; 824, I5 L. R. A. N. S. 379, note, and in some states property like
bank deposits, if long unclaimed, will vest in the state, State v. First Nat.
Bank of Portland, 61 Oreg. 551, Ann. Cas. 1914 B 153, note; Mich. C. L.
Secs. 321 if., though in such cases the state is a kind of trustee for the ab-
sent owner, Atty. Gen. v. Provident Inst. for Savings, 201 Mass. 23; Mich.
C. L. Sec. 338.
The state has such interest in a will of one dying without heirs that it is
a proper party to 'a contest. State v. Lancaster, 1I9 Tenn. 6,38. Cf. fn re
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McClellan's Estate, 27 S. Dak. xog, Ann. Cas. 1913 C io2q, note, though of
course there is no escheat if the last owner has by valid will fully disposed
of his property. The right of the state to contest such a will does not depend
upon statute, State v. Lancaster, supra, but is often expressly so given. Mich.
C. L. Sec. 13839. Property by statute escheating to the county in which it is
found is subject to an inheritance tax, People v. Richardson, 269 Ill. 275,
commented on in 29 HIv. L. Rzv. 455, and some cases consider the state
the ultimate heir, 29 HAXv. L. Rzv. 455, but this cannot be sustained. See 21
HAav. L. Rxv. 452, contra. If the state were regarded as an heir title would
not fail, and the better view is that the state takes because there is no heir.
Barnett's Trusts [Igo2], i Ch. 847. Such was the view adopted in the recent
case of Delaney v. State, 174 N. W. 29o (North Dakota, May, igig). The
owner of certain personal property died. An administrator was appointed, he
administered, made final report, and was discharged. The probate court
decreed that the "State of North Dakota is the only heir of said deceased,
and as such is entitled to the whole of said estate." Action was brought
against the State by plaintiffs who claimed to be heirs of the former owner.
It was held that in such case the State does. not take as heir, nor ipso facto
on failure of heirs, but only by pursuing the remedy provided by statute to
have property declared escheated.
The feudal conception of escheat, as a reverter of land to the lord or to
the king, like so many feudal concepts, has persisted even in this country,
where at least since the Revolution there have been no feudal tenures, 3
Washburn Real Property, Sec. 1866 (6th Ed.). According to the feudal
view, in the United States the state takes the place of the lord or the crown,
not as ultimate heir, but as donor or grantor of all land. Most land is in-
deed held by patent from the state, and many statutes, like the North Dakota
statutes involved in the Delaney case, in substance provide that the original
and ultimate right to all property, real and personal, is in the state, and
when title fails for want of heirs it "reverts to the state:' Political Code of
North Dakota, i9o5, Sections 6, 7; Code of 1913, Sections 8, 9; Delaney v.
State, supra.
But these ideas are relics of a past that is gone, and it is believed to be
more consistent with the social and property concepts of today to treat all
private property not belonging to any particular individual as bona vacantia
to be taken over by the state for the good of all. Sands v. Lyndharn, 27 Grat.
291, In re McClellan's Estate, 27 S. Dak. iog, Ann. Cas. 1913 C io2. That
such property is to be taken for the community good is seen in many stati-
tory provisions that such property shall go to some special public purpose,
like the common school fund. Mich. C. L. Sections 324, 331; Shannon's
Tenn. Code, Sec. 3825.
By the better view, such property does not ipso facto vest in the state.
The state by inquest of office must first establish the fact of intestacy and
failure of heirs, and it must do this in the way provided by statute. In the
Delaney case the probate court, as part of the probate proceedings, found
there were no heirs, and decreed distribution to the state. This was no
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office found, and vested nothing in the state. Failure of ownership is a fact
to be established. It is "most unusual, not to say unnatural, that there shall
live a person who does not have some heir, living at the time of his death,
capable of inheriting his property." There is, therefore, a very strong pre-
sumption against escheat, and the state has no purpose to take property un-
less all heirs fail. State v. Williams, 99 Miss. 293, Ann. Cas. 1913 E 38!, note;
3 Washburn Real Property, Section 1869 (6th Ed.). This presumption is
sometimes changed by statute, Mich. C. L. 329, but in suing to declare lands
escheated the state must rely on the strength of its own title, and not on the
weakness of the contestant's. State v. Williams, supra. Under a mortmain
statute one in good faith buying of a corporation land which it might not
own, and which the state on office found might have forfeited on a judgment
declaring escheat, acquires a title indefeasible against the state and all others.
Louisville School Board v. King, 127 Ky. 824. Indeed, it was held in that
case that it would be unconstitutional for the legislature to vest title ipso
facto, in the state, and deny an adverse claimant a chance to resist escheat,
and it is believed the same things would apply to the Delaney case in which
plaintiffs sought to contest the finding that there were no heirs. After office
found as provided by statute there seems no reason why the title of the
state to property acquired by escheat should not be as secure as that of a
distribute under ordinary probate proceedings. In neither case is the pro-
bate court the usual court of final reso rt to try out the rights of respective
claimants. Delaney v. State, supra; In re McClellan's Estate, 27 S. Dak. iog,
Ann. Cas. 1913 C 1o29. After final proceedings in the probate court the
escheat is in suspense pending inquest of office and decree of escheat as
provided in the statute governing escheats. Estate of Miner, x43 Cal. 194.
E. C. G.
AccmNT INSURANcZ-INTXRPPmTATIoN or WoRD "IMMEDIAmT."-One of
the common clauses in accident insurance policies is one providing that the
insured shall receive a specified sum of money per week for "loss of time"
resulting from injuries due to "external, violent and accidental means" which
shall "independently of all other causes, immediately, wholly and continuously
disable the insured from transacting any and every kind of business pertain-
ing to his occupation." A considerable amount of litigation has involved the
interpretation of the various words and phrases in such a clause. On the
interpretation of "total disability" see 4 HARv. L. Rxv. 176. Concerning the
scope of "external, violent and accidental means" see 14 MICH. L. Rv. 329.
It is proposed to consider briefly in this note the word "immediately."
In two jurisdictions, the word "immediately," when used in clauses as
indicated above, has been held to be a word of causation, and synonymous
with the phrase "independently of all other causes;" or,'at least (said the
courts), the presence of the said phrase and the word "immediately" in the
same clause, rendered the said word ambiguous, and therefore, since all
ambiguities should be construed favorably to the insured, the plaintiff was
entitled to recover. Shera v. Ocean Accident Corporation, 32 Ont. Rep. 4xi;
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Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Branham, 34 Ind. App. 243. On the contrary, all
other courts which have passed upon the question have held that when both
the said phrase and the said word were used in such a clause, there was
clearly no ambiguity, but the phrase "independently of all other causes"
referred to causation, and "immediately" was used to designate proximity of
time between the accident and the disability. See especially Merrill v. Travel-
ers' Co., 9z Wis. 329; Williams v. Preferred Mutual, 9x Ga. 698.
. Assuming that "immediately" is used in such clauses as an adverb of time,
the question arises, how much time? The Kansas Court in a recent decision
(Erickson v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, io3 Kans. 831) follow-
ing its own precedent (Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Barnes,
72 Kans. 293), held that the word means "within such a time as the processes
of nature consume in bringing the person affected to a state of total disa-
bility!' Hence, a baseball pitcher who was injured in September but was not
disabled until the following February was held to have been "immediately"
disabled. The reasons given for such decisions are that the processes of
nature require time in which to operate, and the insured should not be pre-
cluded from a recovery merely because of the tardiness of-nature. The prac-
tical effect of such a doctrine is to construe "immediately" as a word of
causation.
In Ritter v. Preferred Masonic Mutual, 185 Pa. go, the court laid down
a different definition of "immediately," viz., "within a reasonable time," and
held that what is a reasonable time is a question for the court. No intimatiori
is given in the opinion as to what matters should be considered in determin-
ing what is a "reasonable time" in such cases. It is possible to construe the
decision as being equivalent to the Kansas view; but the Pennsylvania court
probably did not intend such an interpretation to be put upon its decision,
for it expressly concedes that the word is used in the policy to mean "in-
stantly" or "at once," but says that, owing to the nature of the policy, there
is not to be attached to the word the strict idea .of instantaneously. The
court held that three days was a reasonable time under the circumstances of
that case.
The overwhelming weight of authority accords in holding that "immediate-
ly" means "presently, without any substantial interval of time" when used in
such clauses, but such definition naturally raises the question, what constitutes
such a substantial interval of time as to be beyond the meaning of the word
"immediately?" The following cases held the number of days indicated to be
such an interval of time: sixty-two days in Merrill v. Travelers' Co., supra;
forty-two days in Pepper v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 113 Ky.
918; thirty-six days in Hagadorn v. Masonic Equitable Ass'n, 69 N. Y. Supp.
831; thirty days in Williams v. Preferred Mutual, supra; twenty-four days in
Vess v. United Benevolent Society, 120 Ga. 411 ; twenty-two days in Laventhal
v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 9 Cal. App. 275; eight days in Wall v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co., iii Mo. App. 5o4; six days in Mullins v. Masonic Pro-
tective Ass'n, i81 Mo. App. 395; five days in Preferred Masonic Mutual v.
Jones, 6o Ill. App. io6; two and one-half days in Windle v. Empire State
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Surety Co, x5 Ill. App. 273. To appreciate fully the reasons and policy of
such decisions necessitates an inquiry into the purpose of the insurer in using
the word "immediately" as it did.
One of the controlling questions in actions on accident insurance policies
frequently is whether or not the disability is the .direct result of accident, and
in cases where the disability did not have inception until a considerable period
of time had elapsed after an accident, this question becomes one of acute diffi-
culty. The insurance companies realize that, since such questions of physiolog-
ical reactions are usually, if not always, decided upon the testimony of the in-
sured and his witnesses-especially his expert witnesses-and since there
exists a strong tendency on the part of juries to resolve such questions in
favor of the insured, the insurer is likely to be subjected to frequent fraitds
and impositions at the hands of its policy holders. For these reasons, the
insurance companies seek to limit their liability, under such clauses as the
one now under consideration, to cases where there can be no doubt as to the
causal, connection between the accident-and the disability. According, the
provision is inserted in the policy that the disability must follow "immediate-
ly" after the injury. Clearly, such a limitation is neither unreasonable nor
contrary to public policy. An insurance company has a right to be arbitrary
in defining the limits of its liability, but in its effort to be arbitrary the com-
pany errs in using a term which is notoriously flexible in the law. It might
better follow the precedent of the common law in limiting the liability for
homicide by the "year and a day" rule, and specify that the disability must
follow within twenty-four or forty-eight hours after the injury, although it
must be admitted that such a provision might lessen the salability of the
policy. However, the decision must be based upon the terms actually em-
ployed in the policy, but these terms should be interpreted with a view toward
giving full effect to the purpose for which the insurer incorporated such
ideas in the policy. The court should consider and respect the reasons and
the theory upon which the insurer drafted the policy, and realize that, al-
though the insurer might have chosen better terms to accomplish its purpose,
the company has rights as well as the policy holder. On the other hand, the
policy should not be so interpreted as to give the holder thereof mere illusory
insurance; if his case comes justly within the terms of the policy, he should
be allowed to recover. The two main questions which the court should ask
itself may be stated thus: First, will a decision that the particular interim
between the time of the injury and the disability in the case at bar is within
the meaning of the term "immediately" adequately preclude the possibilities
of fraud and imposition against which the insurer desired to protect itself,
or will such a decision serve as a precedent for opening the door to just such
hazards? Second, will such a decision deprive the policy holder of any bene-
fits which he had a right to expect?
It can hardly be doubted that, if the Kansas court had properly considered
these questions, especially the first one, it would not have enunciated the
doctrine which it did. If the Pennsylvania court had considered said ques-
tions,- it might still have been justified in announcing the rule which it did,
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depending, of course, upon what the court means by a "reasonable time"
The soundness of the other decisions cited can hardly be doubted, except
possibly Windle v. Empire State Surety Co., in which the court might be
accused of failing to observe adequately the second question. But it would
be almost unfair to criticize severely the courts for any decision in this regard
not clearly absurd, for it is evident that, by the use of such word, the in-
surance companies have imposed upon the courts an extremely nice question,
;tnd one upon which judicial minds might reasonably differ. See i CoRwus
Jurs 468, Section 178; CooLZY, Bimrs oN INSuR1ANc, Vol. 4, p. 3168 (e);
Vol. 7, P. 3168 (e) ; ANN. CAS. 1914 D, 380, note. L.K.
CONTINUANCE OV STATUS AS PASSENGER wHiLE TRANSEWRING FROM ONS
CAR To ANoTH ln-There is a great deal of confusion in the reports as to
whether a passenger on a street car, who is required to transfer to another
car, is still a passenger to whom the railway company owes a high degree of
care during the act of transferring. In Feldman v. Chicago Railways Co.
(IlL i919), x24 N. . -334, the plaintiff was walking from the northwest to
the southwest corner of Twelfth Street and Cicero Avenue in transferring
from one car to another; while so doing the rear end of the car from which
he had just alighted swung around on a switch and struck him, knocking him
down and injuring him severely. The court took the view that the relation
of carrier and passenger continued while he was transferring, and held the
defendant company liable. The dissenting judges pointed out that the cases
cited as supporting the majority opinion were either cases of steam railways
where the injured person had not left the premises of the defendants, or
cases in which the plaintiff was in the act of boarding or alighting at the time
he was injured.
In the case of steam. railways the question seems to be settled. "Thek
general rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger begins as soon as
one intending in good faith to become a passenger enters, in a lawful man-
ner, upon the carrier's premises to engage passage, and that relation continues
to exist until the passenger has been made aware of his arrival at the place
of destination and has had a reasonable time to alight from the car and to
leave the premises- of the carrier." Powell v. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co., 22o.
Pa. St. 638. Thus, a person was held a passenger when on the depot premises
for the purpose of taking a train, though he had not purchased a ticket, in
Grimes v. Pennsylvania Co., 36 Fed. 72. Likewise, where a passenger alighted
at an intermediate station for the purpose of refreshment (Watters v. Phila.
B. & W. R. Co., 239 Pa. 492), of sending or receiving telegrams (Alabama
G. S. Ry. Co. v. Coggins, 88 Fed. 455), of taking exercise (Gannon v. C. R.
. & P. Ry. Co., i41 Ia. 37), of talking with an acquaintance while cars were
being switched (Ark. Cent. Rd. Co. v. Bennett, 82 Ark. 393), or of engaging
in an altercation with a servant of the railway company (Layne v. C. & 0.
Ry. Co., 66 W. Va. 607). But where a passenger left the premises of the
railroad company at an intermediate point and went to a hotel to spend the
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night, it was held that the relation of carrier and passenger was severed for
the time being, and could only be resumed when he again entered the station
yard for the purpose of completing the journey. King v. Central of Ga. Ry.
Co., io7 Ga. 754.
In cases of street cars and other carriers the same rule seems to prepon-
derate. In Birmingham Ry. Co. v. Wise, 149 Ala. 492, allegations that a car
stopped to receive passengers at the stop where plaintiff and her children
were waiting to board it, but that she did not board it by reason of the
failure of the servant in charge of the car to allow her a reasonable time to do
so, were held sufficient to show a passenger relation. A person on a station
platform of a suburban electric railway signalling an approaching car to stop
was held a passenger, in Great Falls & 0. D. R. Co. v. Hammerly, 4o App. D.
C: 196. (But see contra, Donovan v. Hartford St. Ry. Co., 65 Conn. 2o.)
And at destination a passenger remains such after alighting until he has had a
reasonable opportunity to reach a place of safety. Louisville Ry. Co. v. Ken-
nedy, 162 Ky. 56D; Melton v. Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co., 153 Ala.
95. But it is held that he ceases to be ai passenger when he has safely
alighted, in Powers v. The Connecticut Co. 82 Conn. 665, and in Columbus
R. R. Co. v. Asbell, 133 Ga. 573.
Plaintiff was held not to have lost his rights as a passenger by leaving a
street car at the motorman's request to help in removing a wagon from the
track (Stuchly v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 182 Ill. App. 337), nor by temporarily
stepping from the car to allow other passengers to alight (Tompkins v. Bos-
ton Elevated Ry. Co., 2oI Mass. 114). A passenger in a taxicab of a com-.
mon carrier, who entered a saloon to procure change to pay the chauffeur
for the part of the journey already completed, was held to remain a passen-
ger, in Fornoif v. Columbia Taxicab Co., 179 Mo. App. 620.
Opposed to the above decisions is the recent case of Niles v. Boston Ele-
vated Ry. Co., 225 Mass. 570. Plaintiff there had to alight at a car barn and
walk about three car lengths in transferring to another car. It was held
she was not a passenger while in the act of transferring. The court stressed
the fact that she was not on defendant's premises, but on the public highway,
exposed to dangers not caused by defendant; she could choose her own way,
her movements being under her own guidance. There is this distinction
between the cases of steam railways and street cars,--that there is usually,
in the case of street cars no station, but passengers must alight in the public
streets, often indeed in the midst of dense traffic. However, it seems that
this should not be permitted to befog the decisions, for it is not suggested
anywhere that the carrier should be held liabte for mishaps due to the density
of traffic or other causes not traceable to the company. The carrier is to be
held only for injuries occasioned by its failure to observe a high degree of
care. There is no greater danger in transferring from one street car to an-
other than in crossing the tracks of a steam railroad to change cars. It is
submitted that the doctrine of Feldman v. Chicago Rys. Co., supra, is sound.
R. G. D.
